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In this paper, we investigate a crucial aspect of the reputation mechanism design in electronic 
markets – the ability of buyers and sellers to revoke r mutually withdraw negative feedback and 
ratings. Based on recent changes in eBay feedback mechanism, we find that the two-way 
reputation system enables certain sellers to behave opportunistically by revoking negative 
feedbacks they receive. This makes the reputation system less effective in discerning the quality of 
sellers. We also find that changes in the reputation system have a significant influence on these 
sellers’ behavior. After revoking is not possible on eBay, sellers put more efforts in the 
transactions. Our findings support the moral hazard assumption regarding seller’s strategic 
behavior. We also discuss the implications of the above findings to reputation mechanism design 
and practice.   
Keywords:  mechanism design, reputation mechanisms, revoking, o line auctions, moral hazard 
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Introduction 
As the now classic adage goes, “on the Internet, no one knows you are a dog”. Given the issues resulting from 
significant information asymmetry in online transactions, it has become more important than ever for online markets 
to adopt mechanisms that help establish and maintain credibility and trust among participants. The most popular and 
well studied among these is the reputation mechanism in markets such as eBay. On eBay, for instance, a buyer can 
leave either positive, neutral, or negative ratings to a seller after a transaction. Based on these feedbacks, the seller’s 
reputation is calculated and metrics such as the total number of feedbacks and the percentage of positive ratings are 
made available to other potential buyers. While eBay’s reputation mechanism is arguably the most establi hed and 
the most scrutinized by the popular press and academics, several other websites including eLance.com, 
rentacoder.com, and amazon.com among others also adopt similar systems. 
Although it has been argued that the reputation system works well for eBay, it is not without drawbacks. One 
particular problem is the potential for “gaming” the system. Typically, both buyers and sellers on eBay can provide 
feedback regarding the other party in the transaction and this feedback is available for others in the marketplace. 
However, it has been suggested that due to the threat of retaliation from sellers, buyers with a bad experience might 
prefer to remain silent instead of leaving negative ratings (Dellarocas and Wood 2008). The ability of buyers and/or 
sellers to “game” the reputation mechanism threatens to not only reduce its effectiveness but also exac rbate 
informational asymmetry.  
Despite the increasing awareness of users’ strategic gaming behavior of online reputation mechanisms and their 
potential adverse impacts, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of how users react to reputation 
systems, and how reputation systems could be appropriately designed (Masclet and Penard 2008). In this paper, we 
investigate a crucial aspect of the reputation mechanism design – the ability of buyers and sellers to revoke or 
mutually withdraw their feedback and ratings. While buyers can leave positive, neutral, or negative feedback for 
sellers, eBay also allowed sellers to rate buyers. A two-way feedback mechanism is often considered to be “fair” to 
both participants in a transaction; however this also allows sellers to retaliate against buyers who provide them with 
negative feedback. Interestingly, a feedback (especially a negative one) can be “revoked” if both the seller and the 
buyer mutually agree to do so. Such revoking may happen if a seller “corrects” his mistake by either rplacing a 
previous low quality product with a better one, or refunds the buyer. Alternatively, a seller could retaliate against a 
buyer who provides negative feedback and then force the buyer to revoke her negative feedback. While in the 
former case, the revoking behavior reflects a seller’s responsibility and honesty to some extent, in the latter, the 
ability to revoke negative feedbacks enables bad seller  to disguise their dark pasts and send misleading signals to 
other potential buyers. In other words, a seller could be an inherently “good seller” and revoking could be a sign of a 
genuine mistake. Alternatively, a seller could be an inherently “bad seller” and revoking could be a sign of the seller 
trying to masquerade as a high quality seller. Either of these characterize a situation with adverse selection where the 
seller types are a given – good sellers or bad seller . A third possibility is one of moral hazard: where the seller is 
able to behave honestly, but chooses not to because of s lf-interest – the case of the “ugly seller”. We are 
particularly interested in understanding which of these behaviors drive revoking behaviors in eBay auctions. More 
importantly, we are interested in examining the impl cations of feedback-revoking behaviors on market efficiency 
and welfare outcomes. 
Our study is among the first to examine the implications of feedback-revoking behavior in online markets. Ours is 
also among the first study to empirically examine if such revoking behavior is due to moral hazard or adverse 
selection. While it has been difficult to empirically differentiate instances of moral hazard from adverse selection, 
recent changes in eBay’s reputation system provide us a unique opportunity to examine this issue.   
Empirically, we take advantage of a recent significant change in eBay’s reputation system. On Jan 30th 2 08, eBay 
announced a radically overhaul of its reputation system for the first time in its history. Among other changes, 
negative feedbacks are no longer allowed to be withdrawn. More importantly, sellers are no longer allowed to leave 
negative feedbacks for buyers starting May 2008 – in essence, eliminating the possibility of strategic behavior by 
sellers. Not surprisingly, this caused outrage amongst sellers, and culminated in a week-long strike (F b 18th -Feb 
25th) to protest these changes. These changes in eBay’s reputation mechanism also allow us to examine the impact of 
changes in reputation mechanism design on seller behaviors as well as transactional outcomes and market 
efficiency. Although there have been numerous studies showing that reputation matters to sales in eBay auctions 
(Dewan and Hsu 2004, Lucking-Reily et al. 2007), we provide the first empirical evidence on sellers’ reactions to 
the changes in reputation system design.  
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We find evidence that sellers do indeed respond to the design of reputation system. In the two-way reputation 
system (prior to the recent changes), certain seller  exhibit opportunistic behavior by revoking negative feedbacks 
they receive. This makes the reputation system less effective in discerning the quality of sellers. We further find 
these sellers are the ones who are more likely to participate in the strike in protest of the recent reputation system 
change on eBay. Interestingly, change in the reputation system has a significant influence on these sell r ’ behavior. 
Most interestingly, we find that after the changes to the reputation system design (banning revoking or mutual 
withdrawal of feedbacks), sellers who were more likly to revoke feedbacks earlier significantly improve the quality 
of their transactions as evidenced by the changes to their reputation scores. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of eBay’s reputation 
system. In section 3 we detail the changes to the reputation system and the strike by sellers. Data are described in 
section 4, followed by empirical analysis in section 5. We discuss our findings and their implications i  section 6. 
Section 7 concludes. 
Overview of eBay’s Reputation System 
eBay launched in 1995 has become one of the dominant online marketplaces in the US. Given the substantial 
information asymmetry faced by buyers and sellers in online markets, a large part of eBay’s success is attributable to 
its effort to build a trustworthy environment for both sellers and buyers. Several factors exacerbate the trust issues 
on a marketplace like eBay. First, participation is easy. To register, the only thing needed is a valid email address. 
Second, there is very little information available about the members of eBay. Members can pick up a pseudonym as 
their IDs and eBay does not reveal the user’s real name or address. Third, the eBay marketplace is truly global, and 
there is no obvious way to refer to institutional or legal systems to resolve disputes in transactions. Although a 
seller’s account could be closed by eBay if significant dishonest behavior is discovered, it is relatively easy for the 
seller to create a new user ID and renew his participation in eBay. 
The primary source of information about a seller or a buyer’s trustworthiness is her feedback score. Upon the 
completion of a transaction, both buyers and sellers have the opportunity to leave a feedback within 90 days of the 
transaction. The feedback has three different levels of valence: positive, neutral, and negative. In addition, they can 
also provide detailed comments about each other or regarding the transaction. Once a feedback is given, t cannot be 
removed unilaterally, unless both the seller and buyer agree to mutually withdraw their feedbacks. eBay displays 
two summary statistics of the feedbacks that constitute a seller’s reputation: the total number of feedbacks a seller 
receives, and the percentage of positive ratings. 
On the face of it, eBay reputation system seems to have been working well. Although economic theories predict that 
feedbacks, as a public good, should be under-provided, about 50% of the buyers on eBay do leave feedbacks 
(Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). Further, over 99% of the eedbacks left on eBay are positive, seemingly suggesting 
that the degree of satisfaction is very high on eBay (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002).  
Yet, there is evidence of inefficiency in eBay’s reputation system. Certain sellers keep selling fraudulent items with 
misleading descriptions without being caught. For instance, it is estimated that over 80% of the Tiffany jewels sold 
on eBay are fakes – leading to suspicions about the 99% positive feedbacks on eBay. Further, one would expect an 
effective reputation system to reward good sellers. However researches have failed to find any consistent evidence 
of the impact of a seller’s reputation on auction price. For instance, Resnick et al. (2006) find that negative 
feedbacks seem to have no impact on buyers’ willingness-to-pay. Cabral and Hortacsu (2004) study laptops, coins 
and beanie babies on eBay and find that neither positive nor negative feedbacks influence the final auction price. 
Melnik and Alm (2002) find that even when a seller doubles his ratings, the consumer’s willingness to pay for gold 
coin only increases by 18 cents. Along the same lines, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) find that positive ratings have a 
negligible impact on price - a result is echoed by Eaton (2005) who find that reputation has little or n  impact on the 
actual bid prices. 
A closer examination of eBay’s feedback mechanism reveals two major problems. The first problem is retalia ion. 
eBay allows sellers and buyers to independently leave feedbacks within 90 days of transaction, and the feedback is 
available immediately to the other party. This creates incentive for one party to strategically hold back its feedback 
as a way of retaliation if the other party provides a negative feedback. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) find evidence 
that half of the time sellers hold their feedback to buyers, even the sellers receive payment from buyers before 
buyers receive the items. Cabral and Hortacsu (2004) also find that if a buyer leaves a negative feedback about a 
seller, he has a 40% chance of getting a negative feedback from the seller. Consequently, due to fear of retaliation, 
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buyers with bad transaction experience are much less likely to leave negative feedbacks to the sellers (Dellarocas 
and Wood 2008). Other studies also reinforce the presence of such reporting bias (Klein et al. 2005; Reichling 
2004). These biased reporting of feedback by parties to a transaction has been shown to be one major reason for the 
overwhelmingly positive feedbacks on eBay---customers with negative experience simply choose not to leave 
negative feedback for sellers. 
The second problem with eBay’s feedback mechanism – and one that is the focus of our study - is revoking. eBay’s 
revoking policy states that the two parties of a transaction are allowed to withdraw their feedbacks based on mutual 
agreement. Although the intention of this policy is to facilitate the reconciliation of any dispute in a transaction and 
correct errors in ratings, in practice revoking creates a way for sellers to manipulate their reputation. In the vast 
majority of instances, revoking (mutual withdrawal of feedbacks) is preceded by both parties leaving ne ative 
feedbacks for each other. If indeed revoking helps convert negative ratings to nullified ratings, revoking can help 
bad sellers disguise their dark pasts and send misleading signals to other buyers on the marketplaces. B cause 
negative ratings are very rare (typically less than 1% of total ratings), by revoking negative ratings, a bad seller can 
effectively manage its reputation to be as good as, or even better, than truly good sellers.  
Retaliation and revoking has made eBay reputation system less effective in signaling the quality of sellers. Scholars 
have suggested different ways to enhance the system. In a theoretical analysis followed by experiments, Masclet and 
Pénard (2008) suggested that the eBay feedback system could be improved by either constraining partners to leave 
ratings simultaneously or by predetermining the rating sequence. Some others have also proposed that eBay should 
allow only the buyer to rate the seller (Chwelos and Dhar 2006), or that eBay should simultaneously reveal both 
partners’ ratings (Reichling 2004).  
In an attempt to possibly address these problems inhere t in the design of its reputation mechanism eBay announced 
dramatic changes to its reputation system in January 2008.  These changes, detailed in next section, are regarded the 
first major overhaul of its reputation mechanism since its inception. 
Recent Changes to eBay’s Reputation System 
eBay announced a drastic overhaul of its reputation system on Jan 30th, 2008. Among other minor changes, th  most 
significant change involved limiting sellers’ strategic gaming behavior. Starting May 2008, sellers are no longer able 
to leave negative feedbacks to buyers. However theycan provide positive or neutral feedbacks. Furthermore, no 
mutual withdrawal (revoking) of the feedbacks is allowed. Bill Cobb, CEO of eBay, in his public announcement on 
the reputation system changes, made the following comments: 
"…… the original intent of eBay's public feedback system was to provide an honest, accurate record of member 
experiences. ……  But overall, the current feedback system isn't where it should be. Today, the biggest issue with the 
system is that buyers are more afraid than ever to leave honest, accurate feedback because of the threat of 
retaliation. In fact, when buyers have a bad experience on eBay, the final straw for many of them is getting a 
negative feedback, especially of a retaliatory nature. Now, we realize that feedback has been a two-way street, but 
our data shows a disturbing trend, which is that sellers leave retaliatory feedback eight times more frequently than 
buyers do ... and this figure is up dramatically from only a few years ago. So we have to put a stop to this and put 
trust back into the system." 
This change in essence, eliminates the seller’s ability to retaliate against buyers. Not surprisingly, this lead to several 
claims of the new system being unfair to sellers and leaving them vulnerable to negligent bidders and scammers. As 
pointed out by one seller:  
"You get bad buyers as often as you get bad sellers. On an expensive transaction, having a buyer cause trouble - by, 
for example, disputing the transaction and requesting a credit-card chargeback after they've already received their 
merchandise - can be financially devastating." 
As a result, a proposal to boycott eBay was initiated by sellers1. A discussion thread on eBay's own forums with the 
title "Sign the pledge: no sales Feb 18-25!" had received thousands of posts, many expressing intentions  join the 
boycott. Facebook and MySpace pages dedicated to the strike began circulating, and YouTube video entitled "Feb 
                                                      
1 It is pertinent to note that along with the changes to feedback policy, eBay also revised its fees. Given the focus on 
the changes to the reputation mechanism, our empirical analysis controls for changes to the fee structu e. 
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18-25th 2008: Worldwide eBay Strike" had racked up 16,000 reviews on a single day (Feb 10th). Due to this strike, 
eBay’s number of listings was reported to decrease by more than 13%. Many sellers abandoned eBay and moved to 
other auction sites like OnlineAuction.com and eCrater.com (USA Today 2008, BusinessShrink 2008).  
Undoubtedly the changes to eBay’s reputation system and the online strike by infuriated sellers are two significant 
events. The reputation system change serves as an exogenous event that allows us to investigate how revok rs and 
non-revokers respond to the different reputations systems.  
In addition, the online strike initiated by sellers serves as a natural field experiment that separates different types of 
sellers. We identify three types of sellers: sellers who participate in the online forum; sellers who actually join the 
strike by boycotting eBay for the week of Feb 18th – Feb 25th; and general sellers who neither participate in the 
forum or the strike. In addition to examining the reputation and behavior of revokers (and non-revokers) under the 
two reputation regimes, we are also interested in understanding if there are any significant differences in reputation 
as well as behaviors among the three groups of seller  – strikers, forum participants, and general sellers.  Finally, as 
mentioned earlier we compare the market efficiency before and after the changes to eBay’s reputation system.  
Data 
The data for this study was collected from April 2008 to February 2009. The strike was initiated by a thread on the 
seller central section of eBay forum. Strikers exprssed their frustration with the proposed changes, signed up, 
revealed their eBay IDs, and pledged to join the on-week strike. From this thread on eBay’s discussion forum, we 
identified 586 unique strikers. We then constructed our control sample of 3278 general sellers who did not 
participate in the strike. A stratified random sample based on the product category distribution of the 586 strikers 
was drawn to control for product categories sold by these eBay members. We further restricted our sample to well-
established sellers with total feedbacks of more than 500. 
Since the strike was initiated in the eBay forum, one may argue that sellers active in the forum were more likely to 
strike merely because they knew about it. To control for this potential confound and ensure the robustne s of our 
results, we introduced a second control group—forum sellers who were active in the forum but did not participate in 
the strike. We also created a stratified random sample of 3083 forum sellers to ensure that they have  similar 
product category distribution as the strikers in our sample. As mentioned earlier, our first control group - the general 
sellers on eBay - did not post or participate in eBay’s forum.  
We collected two types of data: sellers’ feedback history and sellers’ listing history data.  We collected the lifetime 
feedback histories until January 2009 for all three categories of sellers – the strikers, the forum sellers, and the 
general sellers. To allow enough time for the new rputation system to have an impact, we define July 2008 to 
January 2009 as the post-change period and correspondingly July 2007 to January 2008 as the pre-change period2. 
While our primary focus is on the change to eBay’s reputation system, eBay also instituted changes to its fee 
structure: lower listings fees (price charged for each item listed to be sold on eBay) and higher final value fees (a 
percentage of the closing price extracted by eBay). Based on their own most recent listings, some eBay sellers 
believed that they would have to pay more because of these changes. Thus, potential financial loss under the new fee 
structure could have also led some sellers to join the strike. To control for this potential impact of changes in the fee 
structure, we collected listing histories for all three types of sellers from January 2008 to March 2008 and from 
January 2009 to March 2009.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on sellers who had fee back histories in both periods - before and after th  change. 
This restricts our sample to 431 strikers, 3037 general sellers and 2479 forum sellers (see Table 1). We compared 
this sample with the left out sample in terms of product category distribution and found no statistical difference. 
                                                      
2 We collected the feedback history from the beginning of eBay to January 2009 for each seller. This data is 
available during our data collection period from April 2008 to February 2009 and we chose July 2007 to January 
2008 as the pre-change period. 
General Topics 
6 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009  
Table 1.  Sample Definition 
 Definition/brief description # of observations 
Strikers Sellers who signed on the strike thread and participated in the strike 431 
General Sellers Sellers who neither had activities n the forum nor participated in the strike 3037 
Forum Sellers Sellers who had activities in the forum but not participated in the strike 2479 
 
Data Analyses 
Prior to any analysis, we first confirmed that the validity of our strikers sample. Although sellers signed up on the 
strike pledge thread, they may not have actually participated in the strike. Economically, each seller has an incentive 
to free-rider on others’ strike efforts especially when it is costless to not join the strike. Moreover, a seller would be 
benefit from encouraging other sellers to strike as he would actually sell more products during the strike period due 
to lower competition. This potential problem, however, is not a concern in our study. As shown in Figure 1, the 
number of listings per seller decreased sharply on the beginning day of the strike and remained at a significantly 
lower level compared to pre-strike period. We did not observe a similar trend for general sellers and forum sellers. 
This suggests that the strikers in our sample did participate in the strike and refrained from listing their products. 
Interestingly, as can be seen from the huge spike pr or to the strike, they also seemed to have increased their listings 
in the pre-strike period. 
 
Figure 1.  Sellers’ Listing Trends 
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Can Strategic Revoking Behavior Explain the Strike? 
Theoretically, sellers with bad reputation are more lik ly to strike because they can no longer “retalia e” against 
buyers who leave negative feedbacks and “protect” their reputation. Because in general the percentage of n gative 
feedbacks is very low, one additional negative feedback will not change the overall feedback very much for a seller 
with already enough number of positive feedbacks. To address this problem when measuring reputation, we only 
counted in feedbacks in the pre-change period (i.e., from July 2007 to January 2008), namely, every seller’s 
reputation is treated as 0 on July 1st 2007. Reputation score is measured as the number of unique positive feedbacks 
subtracted by the number of unique negative feedbacks.  
Table 2 presents the reputation profile for the thre categories of sellers. Compared with other seller , strikers have a 
lower reputation score. If we only count the positive and negative feedbacks as eBay does3, strikers are similar to 
general sellers and forum sellers. Merely looking at positive feedbacks and negative feedbacks does not reveal much 
information about whether strikers were worse than ge eral sellers or not. However, a close inspection of all types 
of feedbacks reveals that strikers have a lower positive feedback percentage and much higher revoked fe back 
percentage than both general sellers and forum seller . These revoked feedbacks are originally negative ones. They 
get nullified when both sellers and buyers mutually gree to do so through negotiation. Considering the original 
negative value of revoked feedbacks, we find that strikers actually have significantly more negative feedbacks 
(0.21%+0.66%=0.87%) than both general sellers (0.31%+0.13%=0.44%) and forum sellers (0.22%+0.11%=0.33%). 
This implies that strikers have strategically negotiated with buyers to revoke negative feedbacks so that they are 
similar to other sellers4.  
While seller and buyers can mutually agree to withdraw their feedbacks, some feedbacks are also withdrawn by 
eBay. A negative feedback is usually withdrawn by eBay if the buyer fails to respond to an “unpaid item 
notification”. In other words, these negative feedbacks are generated when bad buyers who do not pay try to blame 
the sellers. We find that sellers are not different in their eBay-withdrawn feedbacks, indicating that all sellers have a 
similar probability of facing bad buyers. Therefore, the differences in seller feedbacks in our sample are primarily 
due to different seller behaviors rather than due to differences in their probability of encountering bad buyers. 
Table 2.  Pre-Change Reputation Profile Comparison for All Feedbacks 
  Distribution Displayed Hidden Detailed Distribution 
 Score Positive Negative Positive Negative Neutral Revoked eBay-
Withdrawn 
Strikers 267.11 99.78% 0.22% 98.72% 0.21% 0.35% 0.66% 0.06% 
General 
Sellers  
436.03 99.65% 0.35% 98.96% 0.31% 0.51% 0.13% 0.09% 
(Forum 
Sellers) 

















*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
                                                      
3 eBay only considers unique positive feedbacks and unique negative feedbacks when displaying the percentag  of 
positive feedbacks. Therefore, we do not present neu ral feedbacks in the “distribution displayed” section. Due to 
space limitation, we do not show the number of positive feedbacks and the number of negative feedbacks in the 
table. The data is available upon request. 
4 Revoked feedbacks might also be caused by a seller’  correcting his/her genuine mistake. We randomly chose 100 
revoked feedbacks and found that the cases of genuin  mistakes are pretty rare. 
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The similarity between strikers and forum sellers indicates that a seller joined the strike not just because he/she was 
active on the forum and knew about it. On eBay, a seller may sell a few times but buy most times. In this case, 
he/she might not care much about strategic revoking. As a robustness check on this, we also separate thes  two and 
compare feedbacks received as a seller for the threcategories of sellers (see Table 3). All major results still hold. 
Table 3.  Pre-Change Reputation Profile Comparison for Feedbacks Received as a Seller 
 Score Positive Negative Neutral  Revoked 
eBay-
withdrawn 



























*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
The above summary statistics consistently indicates that the elimination of the revoking feedback mechanism may 
be a major reason for the strike. However there are confounding factors. As we have discussed, potential financial 
loss under the new fee policy may also lead sellers to strike. To measure potential financial loss, we first calculated, 
for each listing, the difference between fees actually charged by eBay under the old fee structure and fees charged 
by eBay if it were under the new fee structure. We collected detailed information about each listing, including 
product category, auction style, start price, final price and usage of features such as gallery pictures and subtitles. 
This allowed us to calculate the exact fee charged by eBay based on the fee structure. We then aggregated the 
differences to the seller level. Because the strike started on Feb 18th, 2008, we only considered listing  one month 
prior to the strike, i.e., from January 18th 2008 to February 17th 2008. 
Table 4 presents the sales profile comparison between s llers. As can be seen, strikers are not different f om general 
sellers and forum sellers in terms of sales. Interes ingly, all three types of sellers would benefit (save money) under 
the new fee policy. However, strikers benefit less. This implies that the change in the fee structure se ms to be one 
major reason for the strike. 
Table 4.  Sales Profile Comparison 
 No. of Listings Overall Sales ($) Fee Difference ($)  















*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
To control the confounding factors, we employ a logit regression model to predict the propensity for strike: 
1 2 3
4 5 6
Logit(strike)=α+β *Listings_Number+β *Powerseller_Status+β *Months_on_eBay
+β *Fee_Difference+β *Reputation_Score+β *Revoked_Percentage
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In the above model, we included several other control variables that could potentially influence participation in the 
strike. Sellers with a larger volume of sales will suffer more financially if they join the strike, and hence are less 
likely to participate. Powersellers are also less likely to join the strike because they would enjoy significant final 
value fee discounts under the new fee structure. Further, the longer a seller has stayed with eBay, the higher his/her 
switching cost (ex: loyal customer base). These sell r  should care more about the long-term interest and thus have 
stronger reaction to the reduction of seller power in the new reputation system. Therefore we included number of 
months on eBay as another control variable. 
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in the regression are provided in Table 5 and Table 
6. The results of the logit regression model are shown in Table 7. Model I is the baseline model. The co fficient of 
fee difference is significantly positive, suggesting that sellers who lose more (or save less) are mor likely to strike. 
The coefficient of reputation score is negative andsignificant, indicating that sellers with lower reputation have a 
higher propensity to join the strike. Consistent with our prediction, sellers with a longer tenure on eBay are found to 
have a higher likelihood to strike for their benefits. Powerseller status and the volume of listings do not have a 
significant effect on a seller’s propensity to strike.  
In Model II we included the revoked feedback percentage in the regression. We find that pseudo R2 increases by 
nearly 300%, supporting that a seller’s revoking behavior has significant explanatory power on their strike 
participation. The coefficient of the percentage of revoked feedbacks is positive and significant at p<0.001 level, 
suggesting that sellers who used to strategically revoke negative feedbacks were more inclined to strike. A 0.1% 
increase in revoked feedback percentage leads to 4.57 percent increase in the odds of joining the strike and a 1% 
increase in revoked feedback percentage leads to 56.35 percent increase in the odds of joining the strike. 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics 
Note: there is one missing value for # of months on eBay. 
 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
# of Listings (1) 1       
Powerseller Status (Dummy)  (2) 0.37* 1      
# of months on eBay (3) -0.06* -0.09* 1     
Fee Difference (4) -0.37* -0.16* 0.07* 1    
Reputation Score (5) 0.37* 0.23* -0.06* -0.15* 1   
Revoked Feedback Percentage (6) 0.11* 0.07* -0.03* -0.02 0.05* 1  
Strike (Dummy) (7) -0.03* -0.01 0.06* 0.04* -0.03* 0.14* 1 




Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of Listings 5947 217.26 333.54 0.00 9848.00 
Powerseller Status (Dummy) 5947 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
# of months on eBay 5946 77.17 20.68 2.87 145.83 
Fee Difference ($) 5947 -20.58 88.02 -699.02 1715.68 
Reputation Score 5947 384.38 1001.60 0.00 35800.00 
Revoked Feedback Percentage 5947 0.16% 0.99% 0.00% 55.56% 
Strike (Dummy) 5947 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
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Table 7. Logit Regression Analyses 
 Model I Model II 
 coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
Intercept -2.980*** 0.000 -3.059***    0.000     
# of Listings 1.770-e05 0.919  -2.202-e04 0.192 
Powerseller Status 0.083 0.459  0.055 0.631     
# of Months on eBay 0.007*** 0.000 0.007***    0.00 
Fee Difference 0.001* 0.012   0.001* 0.018    
Reputation Score -3.506-e04* 0.027 -4.085-e04* 0.016 
Revoked Feedback Percentage  44.695*** 0.000 
# of observations 5946 5946 
Pseudo  R2 0.0116 0.0443 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
From our reputation profile comparison and logit regression analyses, we find that strikers were indeed sellers with 
lower reputation scores and higher negative feedbacks – sellers who strategically nullified their negative feedbacks 
using eBay’s revoking mechanism and successfully masqueraded as sellers with higher reputation scores. W  next 
examine if these strikers were just “bad sellers” (a case of adverse selection) or “ugly sellers” (a case of moral 
hazard) by examining their behaviors and reputation scores after the changes to eBay’s reputation mechanism. 
Changes in Seller Behavior: The Ugly Seller 
In this section we explore any potential changes in seller behavior under the new reputation system in an attempt to 
shed light on the nature of seller behavior. If the strikers are indeed “bad sellers” (i.e., a case of adverse selection), 
we should expect to see the new reputation system more effectively reveal these “bad sellers”. On the other hand, if 
sellers were indeed “ugly sellers” (i.e., a case of m ral hazard) they should be able to improve their quality and 
improve their reputation under the new reputation system.  
Table 8.  Post-Change Reputation Profile Comparison: Strikers vs. Non-Strikers 
 Score Positive Negative Neutral  
eBay-
withdrawn 























*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Table 8 presents the reputation profiles for sellers under the new reputation system. Comparing Table 8 with Table 2, 
we find that the negative feedback percentage increases for all three types of sellers (0.88% to 0.90% for strikers, 
0.44% to 0.69% for general sellers, and 0.33% to 0.59% for forum sellers). This is consistent with our prediction: 
since sellers are no longer able to prevent buyers from leaving negative feedbacks by retaliation and revoke negative 
feedbacks, they are expected to receive more negativ  feedbacks under the new reputation system.  
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In contrast with the finding that strikers actually had a higher negative feedback percentage under the old reputation 
system, there is no difference in negative feedback percentage between strikers and other two types of sellers after 
the ban on revoking. Also, the absolute increase or the percentage increase in negative feedback percentage for 
strikers is much smaller than the increase for general sellers and forum sellers. If moral hazard prevails on eBay, 
after revoking is banned, all sellers who are good by nature are supposed to behave honestly, and consequently, 
there should be no difference between strikers and other sellers in terms of negative feedback percentage. On the 
contrary, under the pure adverse selection scenario, st kers who are “bad sellers” will reveal themselves by their 
higher negative feedback percentage on losing their“protection”. The smaller increase in negative feedbacks for 
strikers and the similar negative feedback percentage between strikers and other sellers supports the moral hazard 
postulates of seller behavior. In other words, sellers (i.e. the strikers in our sample) are the “ugly sellers” - inherently 
good sellers who strategically choose to behave dishonestly.  
Robustness check 
Strikers are those sellers who responded strongly to the reputation change. However, they might not be 
representative of sellers who use revoking to strategically improve their reputation scores. To examine this, we 
combined all three categories of sellers and partitioned the combined sample into two groups, based on their 
revoking behavior.  We then defined “revokers” as sellers who initially received more than 4 negative fe dbacks and 
then revoked at least 40% of these negative feedbacks. “Non-revokers” are sellers who never revoked negative 
feedbacks. This resulted in 249 revokers and 2786 non-revokers. 
Table 9 presents the reputation profile comparison between revokers and non-revokers for both before and after the 
change. Revokers have a higher negative feedback per entage than non-revokers. However, the increase in n gative 
feedback percentage for revokers is only 0.07% (from 1.27%+0.53%=1.80% to 1.87% whereas it is 0.24% (from 
0.26% to 0.50%) for non-strikers. This implies that compared with non-revokers, revokers have changed th ir
behavior in a positive way to mitigate the increase in negative feedbacks caused by the reputation system change. 
This further supports the moral hazard assumption about seller behavior.  
As an additional robustness check, we restricted or relaxed the definition criteria for revokers. We find that the 
moral hazard assumption is still supported.  Defining revokers as the top 5% or 10% sellers in terms of their revoked 
feedback percentage produced similar results.  
Table 9.  Reputation Profile Comparison: Revokers vs. Non-Revokers 
 Pre-Change Post-Change 
 Positive Negative Neutral Revoked eBay-
withdrawn 
Positive Negative Neutral eBay-
withdrawn 
Revokers 97.08% 0.53% 1.02% 1.27% 0.10% 97.35% 1.87% 0.68% 0.10% 
Non-
Revokers 
99.26% 0.26% 0.42% 0.00% 0.06% 99.15% 0.50% 0.29% 0.09% 
T-test -16.08*** 4.74*** 12.03*** 18.57*** 0.78 -7.98*** 6.52*** 6.38*** 0.78 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
We also find additional evidence on revokers’ changing their selling strategies. On eBay, when an item fails to sell 
to the winning bidder or when the reserve price is not met or if the seller has duplicates items for sale, the seller can 
make a second-chance offer (SCO) to other bidders. A seller can offer to the item multiple “losing bidders” and in 
many cases the seller has to choose one of the “losing bidders” and request to cancel the transactions with other 
“losing bidders” who also accept the second-chance off r. However, this could make the buyers (especially 
inexperienced buyers) suspect the transaction. As noted by a buyer: “…I've never done or accepted a SCO, got 
burned really bad when I first started here…”. However, instead of using second-chance offers, a seller could relist 
the item again to avoid any potential misunderstanding, notwithstanding the additional effort and expens . As shown 
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in Table 10, we find that both revokers and non-revok rs have reduced the percentage of second-chance offers, 
suggesting that sellers now deliberately seek to reduc  any misunderstanding. Interestingly, the magnitude is much 
greater for revokers (1.64%-0.97%=0.67%) compared with non-revokers (1.04%-0.83%=0.21%). The greater 
reduction in second-chance offers further suggests that “revokers” have changed their behavior for the better. 
Table 10.  Selling Behavior Comparison: Revokers vs. Non-Revokers5 
 Second-Chance Offers Store Inventory Listings 
 Revokers Non-Revokers Revokers Non-Revokers 
2008 Jan - 2008 Mar 1.64% 1.04% 8.78% 9.91% 
2009 Jan - 2009 Mar 0.97% 0.83% 12.61% 10.50% 
T-test 3.28* 2.23* -1.99* -1.46 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
  
In addition, compared with non-revokers, revokers have significantly increased the percentage of store inv ntory 
listings. Store inventory items are sold on the seller’s eBay store at a set price. They have less visibility in regular 
eBay search and browse results than auction-style and fixed price listings. Yet typically from the eBay store page, a 
buyer gets more information about the seller as well as all the products sold by the seller. As a result, the transaction 
is more likely to be positively evaluated. Indeed, we find that store inventory listings have a 0.38% higher 
possibility of receiving positive feedbacks than auction-style and fixed price listings based on the listing data from 
January 2008 to March 2008. An increase in store item listings reflects revokers’ efforts to provide more quality 
information despite the reduced visibility of listings. 
It should be noted that eBay’s change in the basic fee structure only applies to auction-style listings and fixed price 
listings. Revokers save less money than non-revokers ($16.90 for revokers and $21.63 for non-revokers). Since in 
general sellers save money under the new fee policy, sellers should have an incentive to increase the percentage of 
auction-style listings and fixed price listings rather than store inventory listings. Thus, the increase in store inventory 
listings is unlikely to be driven by the change in fee structure and more likely by changes in seller behavior. Also, 
because revokers save less money, they have fewer incent ves to increase the percentage of auction-style listings and 
fixed price listings. Therefore, the decrease in second-chance offers should be smaller for revokers if only 
considering the change in fee structure. The observed greater decrease in second-chance offers implies that it is not 
driven by the change in fee structure but by changes in their behavior. 
Discussions and Implications 
In this paper, we study the strategic gaming behavior resulting from the ability of sellers to revoke their feedback on 
eBay. We find evidence that certain sellers strategically utilize revoking to “improve” their reputation. Compared 
with general sellers, strikers had a much higher revok d feedback percentage. We find that the changes to the 
reputation mechanism instituted by eBay, has had a significant influence on these sellers’ behavior. We find 
evidence that they put in more effort into their transactions and receive the same level of negative ratings as other 
sellers. 
These findings make significant contributions to the literature of online reputation system design (ex: Dellarocus 
2005; Fan, Tan and Whinston 2005; Qu, Zhang and Li 2008;  Zhou, Dresner, and Windle 2008). A reputation 
system should facilitate market transactions by separating good players (either seller or buyer) from bad ones and 
inducing honest behavior. We provide the first empirical evidence that sellers do respond to the design of the 
reputation system. Allowing revoking in feedback mechanism will lead to sellers’ strategic gaming behavior. After 
                                                      
5 Here, we focused on sellers who had listings in both periods. The analysis is based on the sample of 104 revokers 
and 2010 non-revokers. 
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revoking is disabled, the more opportunistic sellers increase their efforts to behave better. The above findings also 
provide empirical evidence for a fundamental assumption in the theory work of reputation system: whether sellers 
should be modeled as intrinsically bad or not.   
This paper is also related to the growing literature of gaming behavior in online marketplace. Kauffman and Wood 
(2005) study the shilling behavior of sellers to artificially raise bidding prices. Cabral and Hortacsu (2004) find that 
about one third of sellers build up their reputations by being a buyer first. Jin and Kato (2006) find that some eBay 
sellers make non-credible claims of quality and mislead buyers. We contribute to the above literature by introducing 
a new way of studying seller’s strategic behavior. Our work is also related to how consumers should interpret 
sellers’ reputation. Zhang (2006) finds that reputation as seller and buyer has different impact on clsing price. We 
suggest that consumers should take into account the revoked feedback to better differentiate seller quality. 
Managerially, this study has two implications. First, the finding that revoking elicits strategic behavior of sellers 
suggests that online market makers should adopt other measures to reveal more quality information to buyers when 
revoking is available to sellers. One potential way is to take into account revoked feedbacks when calculating 
overall reputation and display the percentage of revok d feedbacks to buyers. Currently there is no easy and 
straightforward way of getting this information from eBay or other similar markets. Second, the finding that seller 
behavior is more of moral hazard than of adverse sel ction suggests that online market makers should focus on 
soliciting truthful behavior through the design of their reputation systems rather than driving out bad sellers. 
Conclusion and Future Work  
Reputation systems are vital to the success of online marketplaces such as eBay. Taking advantage of the exogenous 
change in eBay reputation system and the resulting online strike, we explore, for the first time, sellers’ strategic 
gaming behavior related with revoking. Our findings shed light on fundamental assumptions about seller behavior. 
We find support that seller behavior is more of moral hazard than a case of adverse selection, which has important 
implications for the design of online reputation systems. 
This study has two limitations. First, we only focus on sellers with lifetime total feedbacks of 500 or higher because 
we want to focus on active sellers and most eBay trnsactions are conducted by these sellers. Adding sellers with 
lower lifetime feedbacks to our sample might change the result of our study. Second, eBay also made some ther 
changes in October 2008, such as no checks or money rder as payment methods. These changes, although not 
related with the reputation system, might also influence sellers’ behavior. We did not directly control for this 
potential influence. However, it should not bias our result too much because most eBay sellers are concerned about 
the change in fee structure and feedback system. 
The study can be extended in two major ways. First, we are working on a more detailed analysis of how revoking 
happens based on both sellers’ and buyers’ detailed fe back behavior. Second, the changes in reputation system 
should have influence on market efficiency, like sell-through rate and price dispersion. A comparison of final 
auction prices between strikers and general sellers can be done to further evaluate the impact of revoking feedback 
mechanism on market efficiency. This is also part of our ongoing investigation.  
Finally, it will be interesting to see whether banning revoking in the new system benefits eBay or not. First, since 
now only buyers can leave negative feedback, the balance seems to have shifted in favor of the buyers. This might 
induce buyers to behave opportunistically hurting sellers. Second, the increase in negative ratings from buyers might 
destroy the perception that eBay is a safe place for transactions. Future research is needed on the costs and benefits 
of adopting a one-way reputation mechanism and the resulting impact on the electronic markets.  
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